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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the debate on fiscal multipliers, in the context of a structural 
model. I estimate a micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, that 
features a rich fiscal policy block and a transmission mechanism for government 
spending shocks, using Bayesian techniques for US data. I find the multiplier for 
government spending to be 1.12, and the maximum impact is when the spending shock 
hits the economy. In addition, the estimated model predicts a positive but small response 
of private consumption to increased government spending. The multipliers for labor and 
capital tax on impact are 0.13 and 0.33, respectively. The effects of tax cuts, on the other 
hand, take time to build, and exceed the stimulative effects of higher spending at horizons 
of 12-20 quarters. The expansionary effects of tax cuts are primarily driven by the 
response of investment. I carry out several counterfactual exercises to show how 
alternative financing methods and expected monetary policy have consequences for the 
size of fiscal multipliers. I also simulate the impact of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 in the estimated model. 
JEL classification: C11, E32, E62, H30  
Bank classification: Fiscal policy; Economic models 
Résumé 
La présente étude contribue au débat sur les multiplicateurs budgétaires dans le cadre 
d’un modèle structurel. L’auteure estime un modèle d’équilibre général dynamique et 
stochastique aux fondements microéconomiques, qui comporte un riche ensemble de 
règles de politique budgétaire et un mécanisme de transmission des variations des 
dépenses publiques, en utilisant des techniques bayésiennes sur des données relatives aux 
États-Unis. Les résultats obtenus indiquent que le multiplicateur des dépenses publiques 
s’établit à 1,12 et que l’incidence maximale a lieu au moment où le choc de dépense 
frappe l’économie. En outre, le modèle estimé prédit une réaction positive mais faible de 
la consommation privée à la hausse des dépenses publiques. Les multiplicateurs de 
l’impôt sur le revenu du travail et de l’impôt sur le capital au moment du choc sont 
respectivement de 0,13 et de 0,33. Les réductions d’impôt, en revanche, mettent du temps 
à faire sentir leurs effets, et elles sont plus stimulantes que les augmentations des 
dépenses à un horizon de 12 à 20  trimestres. Leur action expansionniste est 
principalement attribuable à la réaction de l’investissement. L’auteure procède à plusieurs 
simulations contrefactuelles afin de montrer en quoi le recours à d’autres modes de 
financement et la politique monétaire attendue ont des conséquences pour la taille des 
multiplicateurs budgétaires. Elle simule également l’incidence de la loi des États-Unis 
intitulée American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 dans le modèle estimé. 
Classification JEL : C11, E32, E62, H30 
Classification de la Banque : Politique budgétaire; Modèles économiques 1 Introduction
In the current economic crisis, countries around the world have taken extraordinary ¯scal measures
in order to stimulate their economies with the hope of boosting demand and limiting job losses.
For instance, in February 2009, the United States passed a $787 billion American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, which amounts to over 5% of annual GDP. These policy actions, however, have
given rise to a heated debate since there is a lack of consensus among economists on the relative
stabilizing e®ects of ¯scal policy measures in the form of current tax cuts or increases in spending.
The objective of this paper is to shed light on this debate in the context of a micro-founded medium-
scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model developed and estimated to explain
the e®ects of discretionary ¯scal policy.
The model considered in this paper features a rich ¯scal block with distortionary labor and
capital income taxes and a careful modeling of the government ¯nancing behavior. Unlike mon-
etary policy, since there is no widely accepted speci¯cation for ¯scal policy, this paper considers
various ¯scal rules, allowing ¯scal variables to respond to the state of the economy and the level of
government debt. Ultimately, the focus is on how the economy responds to ¯scal policy actions in
the form of changes in government spending, tax rates and lump-sum transfers.
In addition, the model features a transmission mechanism for government spending shocks,
motivated by the fact that most commonly used business cycle models are not appropriate to study
the e®ects of public spending shocks. As shown in the seminal paper by Baxter and King (1993),
when government spending ¯nanced by lump-sum taxes rises, households face a negative wealth
e®ect and inevitably lower their consumption and increase hours worked. The increase in labor
supply also causes real wages to fall. This is, however, contrary to the ¯ndings of empirical studies
that use structural vector autoregressions (VARs) to identify government spending shocks (e.g.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas and Mihov (2001)), and ¯nd consumption and wages rising in
response to increased government consumption.1 In order to allow for a channel of transmission of
government spending shocks, I consider a model which embeds deep habit formation in public and
private consumption, as introduced in Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006). Deep habits imply
that agents form habits over individual varieties of goods, as opposed to a composite consumption
good. This new feature gives rise to counter-cyclical markups, allowing wages to rise in response to
a government spending shock. If this increase is large enough, it induces households to substitute
away from leisure to consumption, which can potentially overcome the negative wealth e®ects.2
As recent public debates have revealed, there is no consensus among economists on the size
1Empirical studies employing di®erent identi¯cation schemes, e.g Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Burn-
side, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) and Mountford and Uhlig (2002) ¯nd an insigni¯cant response of consumption
and also do not ¯nd private consumption crowded out by government consumption. On the other hand, Ramey and
Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2008) argue that anticipated changes in spending driven by military expenditures reduce
private consumption.
2Zubairy (2009) shows that a medium scale model with lump-sum taxes, when augmented with deep habits, is
able to successfully explain the e®ects of government spending shocks on most macroeconomic variables. That paper,
however, estimates the model using a limited information approach of matching impulse response functions and does
not consider distortionary taxes.
4of ¯scal multipliers, which summarize the e®ects of a ¯scal policy action on GDP. The need to
study ¯scal policy and its propagation through the economy in the context of a structural model
arises since pre-existing works on ¯scal multipliers employ very di®erent identi¯cation schemes.
This makes it di±cult to compare the resulting multiplier estimates. For instance, Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) identify government and tax shocks based on the automatic response of ¯scal
variables to the state of the economy relying on high frequency data at quarterly level and ¯nd a
spending multiplier for output in the neighborhood of 1 and a tax multiplier of 0.7 on impact.3
Mountford and Uhlig (2002) use economic theory and econometric techniques to show that the tax
multiplier is 0.19 and the spending multiplier is 0.44 on impact but the tax multiplier is signi¯cantly
larger than the spending multiplier for longer horizons. Romer and Romer (2007), in a narrative
study of tax changes ¯nd that the exogenous tax changes of 1% of GDP causes a slow on impact but
steadily growing contractionary response of GDP and the estimated maximum impact is a fall of
3%.4 Identi¯cation of ¯scal shocks is in general complicated due to di±culties in isolating exogenous
movements in ¯scal variables, that are not simply an automatic response to the economy and also
due to lags in implementation. Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008) point out that small ¯scal VARs,
employed in empirical identi¯cation of ¯scal shocks, assign an information set to the econometrician
that is strictly smaller than the information set on which agents base their decisions, and so could
also lead to biased results for impulse response functions. Also, these VARs generally do not impose
the government intertemporal budget constraint or consider ¯scal ¯nancing decisions.5
In this paper, I undertake a likelihood-based Bayesian estimation of a structural model. This
full-information approach ¯ts the model to all the variation in the data, and not just dynamic e®ects
of a policy shock. Along with standard macroeconomic aggregate variables, I also use ¯scal variables
as observable. These include data on government spending, and time series for labor and capital
tax rates, which further allow the model to distinguish between the e®ects of the two di®erent kinds
of tax changes. Using Bayesian techniques I can also ¯nd the whole posterior distributions of the
¯scal multipliers, which are more informative than just point estimates.
The paper reports the implied multipliers for all the ¯scal instruments in the estimated model
and shows how the ¯scal shocks transmit through the economy. The main results can be summarized
as follows: The multiplier for government spending is found to be 1.12. This means that a 1 percent
of GDP increase in government spending increases GDP overall by 1.12 percent. The multiplier
is larger than 1 since the estimated model predicts a positive response of private consumption to
government spending, which is in contrast to models that do not consider a channel of transmission
of government spending shocks, but is consistent with other empirical studies. The multipliers for
labor and capital tax on impact are much smaller. A cut in tax revenues of 1 percent of GDP, driven
3Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) also ¯nd numbers close to 1 for spending multipliers using a similar iden-
ti¯cation scheme.
4Mertens and Ravn (2008) use the narrative evidence of Romer and Romer (2007) to distinguish between antic-
ipated and unanticipated tax shocks and suggest that output contracts in response to an anticipation of future tax
cuts but booms in reaction to implemented tax cuts.
5Chung and Leeper (2007) and Favero and Giavazzi (2007) take debt considerations into a VAR and ¯nd that
omitting a debt feedback can result in incorrect estimates of the dynamic e®ects of ¯scal shocks.
5by labor and capital taxes cause GDP to increase by 0.13 and 0.33 percent, respectively. However,
in contrast to increased spending which has the maximum impact as soon as the shock hits the
economy, the e®ects of tax shocks take time to build. The stimulative e®ects of tax cuts exceed the
e®ects of higher spending at horizons of 12-20 quarters and are primarily driven by the response
of investment. These results also highlight the fact that multipliers vary signi¯cantly across the
horizon and thus the stimulative e®ect in the short-run di®ers from e®ects in the longer-run.
This estimated model provides an empirical framework to critically evaluate di®erent ¯scal
policies. In counterfactual exercises, I examine how alternative ¯nancing decisions alter the size
of multipliers and the role that automatic stabilizers play in determining the stimulative e®ect of
spending. The results indicate that while the multipliers are mostly una®ected at shorter horizons of
up to a year, the method of ¯nancing, either by increased de¯cits or raising taxes more aggressively
is important for longer-run consequences.
I also provide evidence on how expected monetary policy have consequences for the stimulative
e®ects of ¯scal measures. The interaction between monetary and ¯scal policy has recently gained
signi¯cant attention, particularly in understanding the consequences of ¯scal policy action under
current circumstances when nominal interest rates are near zero. See for example Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009), Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009), Davig and Leeper
(2009) and Eggertsson (2009). The results in this paper are complementary. I ¯nd that the
response of the monetary authority to deviations of output from steady state has signi¯cant e®ects
on the size of ¯scal multipliers. In fact, if the monetary authority is relatively accommodative, then
increased spending has a signi¯cantly higher stimulative e®ect.
Lastly, I simulate the impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 in the
estimated model, as a combination of increased government spending and a cut in labor taxes. This
¯scal stimulus plan results in a considerable expansion in GDP, with the largest e®ects predicted in
early 2010. These e®ects on output, however are accompanied by a signi¯cant rise in government
debt, and since the households are forward-looking and anticipate higher taxes in the future to
¯nance this plan, the stimulative e®ects on GDP decline rapidly over the course of next few years.
This paper is related to earlier work by Coenen and Straub (2005), Lopez-Salido and Rabanal
(2006) and Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009). These papers estimate a model of ¯scal policy that
extends the work of Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007), and feature a fraction of the population
being liquidity constrained in order to match the empirical evidence on the e®ects of government
spending shocks.6 However, in contrast to this paper, the focus in the aforementioned papers
has primarily been to see if the estimated model can reconcile the positive response of aggregate
consumption to government spending. They do not explore detailed ¯scal rules or consider the
consequences of alternative ¯nancing methods and expected monetary policy on ¯scal multipliers.
6Along with sticky prices, Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) model non-competitive behavior in labor markets
and a fraction of the economy consisting of rule-of-thumb consumers who can not borrow and save, and consume
their entire current income each period. In response to a government spending shock, price rigidities leads to a rise
in wages which causes credit constrained consumers to raise their consumption. If a large fraction of all consumers
in the economy are assumed to be credit constrained, they get a positive response for aggregate consumption to a
government spending shock.
6The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical model. In
Section 3, I provide the description of the estimation procedure used. Section 4 presents the
estimation results and model dynamics and Section 5 highlights the ¯scal multipliers implied by
the estimates. Section 6 shows some counterfactual exercises to consider alternative ¯nancing
decisions. In Section 7, I explore the interaction between monetary and ¯scal policy. Section 8
shows the simulation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and ¯nally, Section
9 concludes.
2 Model
This is a medium scale DSGE model based on the work of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005). Most features are standard to the literature, such as nominal rigidities in the form of price
and wage stickiness, and real rigidities in the form of variable capacity utilization and investment
adjustment cost. This framework serves as a starting point since it has been shown to ¯t the
data well, for example by Del-Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2005) and Smets and
Wouters (2007). The speci¯c departures include deep habits in public and private consumption,
as ¯rst introduced in Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006), as a transmission mechanism for
government spending shocks and a detailed ¯scal block.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households of measure one indexed by j 2
[0;1]. Each household j 2 [0;1] maximizes lifetime utility function, which depends on consumption,
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In this formulation, dt is an intertemporal preference shock, or a shock to consumer's impatience
level and a®ects both the marginal utility of consumption and marginal disutility of labor. It follows
an autoregressive process,7
^ dt = ½d ^ dt¡1 + ²d
t; (2)
where ½d 2 [0;1] is the autoregressive coe±cient, and ²d
t is i.i.d N(0;¾2
d). Households derive utility
from consumption of government provided goods, given by x
g
t here, which is separable from private
consumption and leisure. This means that public spending does not a®ect the marginal utility of
private consumption or leisure.8
7Throughout the paper, a hatted variable represents log deviations from its steady state.
8This is a common assumption in the literature, and studies such as Aschauer (1985), Ni (1995) and McGrattan
(1994) who examine whether in fact private and public consumption are substitutes or complements ¯nd mixed and
inconclusive results.
7The variable xc
t is a composite of habit adjusted consumption of a continuum of di®erentiated
















it¡1 denotes the stock of habit in consuming good i in period t, the parameter ´ is the
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The parameter bc 2 [0;1) measures the
degree of external habit formation, and when bc is zero, the households do not exhibit deep habit
formation. The stock of external habit is assumed to depend on a weighted average of consumption
in all past periods. Habits are assumed to evolve over time according to the law of motion,
sC
it = µcsC
it¡1 + (1 ¡ µc)cit: (4)
The parameter µc 2 [0;1) measures the speed of adjustment of the stock of external habit to
variations in the cross-sectional average level of consumption of variety i. When µc takes the value
zero, habit is measured by past consumption. This slow decay in habit allows for persistence in
markup movements.
For any given level of consumption x
c;j
t , purchases of each individual variety of good i 2 [0;1]
in period t solves the dual problem of minimizing total expenditure,
R 1
0 Pitcitdi, subject to the
aggregation constraint (3), where Pit denotes the nominal price of a good of variety i at time t.
The optimal level of c
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Note that consumption of each variety is decreasing in its relative price, Pit=Pt and increasing in
level of habit adjusted consumption x
c;j
t . The demand function in equation (5) has a price-elastic
component that depends on aggregate consumption demand, and the second term is perfectly price-
inelastic. An increase in aggregate demand increases the share of the price-elastic component, and
thus increases the elasticity of demand, inducing a decline in the mark-up. In addition to this,
¯rms also take into account that today's price decisions will a®ect future demand, as is apparent
due to sit¡1 term, and so when the present value of future per unit pro¯t are expected to be high,
¯rms have an incentive to invest in the customer base today. Thus, this gives them an additional
incentive to appeal to a broader customer base by reducing markups in the current period. This
countercyclicality of the price markup has been empirically documented by Bils (1987), Rotemberg
8and Woodford (1999) and Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2007) among others.9
Each household j is a monopolistic provider of a di®erentiated labor service, and is assumed to
supply enough labor, h
j















t =Pt and wt ´ Wt=Pt. W
j
t denotes the nominal wage charged by household j at time
t, Wt is an index of nominal wages prevailing in the economy, and ht is a measure of aggregate labor
demand by ¯rms. The parameter ~ ´ is the elasticity of substitution between di®erentiated labor
types. In addition, wage rigidities are modeled as a convex cost of adjusting nominal wages which is












where ~ ® denotes the wage adjustment cost parameter.
The household is assumed to own physical capital, kt, which accumulates according to the
following law of motion,
k
j



















t denotes investment by household j and ± is a parameter denoting the rate of depreciation














, and therefore in the steady state it satis¯es S =
S0 = 0 and S00 > 0. These assumptions imply the absence of adjustment costs up to ¯rst-order in
the vicinity of the deterministic steady state. Here, ¹t denotes an e±ciency shock to the investment
adjustment cost. It also follows an autoregressive process given by
^ ¹t = ½¹^ ¹t¡1 + ²
¹
t ; (8)
where ½¹ 2 [0;1] is the autoregressive coe±cient, and ²
¹
t is i.i.d N(0;¾2
¹).
Owners of physical capital can control the intensity at which this factor is utilized. Formally,
let ut measure capacity utilization in period t. It is assumed that using the stock of capital with
intensity ut entails a cost of a(ut)kt units of the composite ¯nal good.10 Households rent the capital
stock to ¯rms at the real rental rate rk
t per unit of capital. Total income stemming from the rental
of capital is given by rk
t utkt.
9Monacelli and Perotti (2008), in fact, also show this fall in the markup in response to a demand shock in the
form of increased government spending, in a structural VAR.
10In steady state, u is set to be equal to 1, and so a(u) = 0. During the estimation, a
00(1)=a
0(1) = ¾u is estimated,
which determines dynamics.




















































where !t = bc R 1
0 PitsC
it¡1=Ptdi. The variable at=¼t ´ At=Pt denotes the real payo® in period t
of nominal state-contingent assets purchased in period t ¡ 1. The variable Át denotes dividends
received from the ownership of ¯rms and ¼t ´ Pt=Pt¡1 denotes the gross rate of consumer-price
in°ation. The households face labor and capital income tax rates, given by ¿w
t and ¿k
t respectively,
and get a lump-sum transfer from the government, given by trt. The term ±qt¿k
t utkt represents a
depreciation allowance for tax purposes.11














t in order to maximize
the utility function subject to (6), (7), (9) and the standard no-Ponzi-game constraint, taking as
given the processes for !t, wt, rk
t , rt;t+1, ¼t, Át, ¿k
t , ¿w
t and trt and the initial conditions ah
0 and k0.
2.2 Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Similar to households, the government is also assumed to form habits on consumption of individual
varieties of goods. Recalling the expression in (1), households also derive utility from public goods.
Utility over public consumption is assumed to be separable from private consumption and leisure,
and the households also form external habits over these public goods. As motivated in Ravn,
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2007), the provision of public services in one community, such as street
lighting or garbage collection, creates other communities to also want access to those public services.
Otherwise, this can also be thought of as the government favoring transactions with procurement
contractors from whom they have purchased public goods in the past.
The government allocates spending over individual varieties of goods, git, so as to maximize the
quantity of a composite good, x
g











The parameter bg measures the degree of habit formation of government consumption and the
variable sG
it denotes the government's stock of habit in good i and is assumed to evolve as follows,
sG
it = µgsG
it¡1 + (1 ¡ µg)git; (10)
where µg is the rate of depreciation of the stock of habits. The government's problem consists of
11This is because part of the payment that capital owners receive from renting out their capital stock merely re°ects
compensation for the stocks depreciation. Therefore, this component of revenue is not income, and so should not be
subject to taxation. In practice, depreciation expenses are tax deductible.
10choosing git, i 2 [0;1], so as to maximize x
g
t subject to the budget constraint
R 1
0 Pitgit · Ptgt,
taking as given the initial condition git = gt, where gt denotes real government expenditures. The










which is analogous to the demand function for household consumption. Therefore, introducing deep
habits in public consumption, along with private consumption, is needed to generate countercyclical
markups in response to both an increase in private and public consumption demand.
The ¯scal authority issues bonds, bt and raises tax revenues, ¿t and the expenditures include
government purchases, gt and lump-sum transfers to households, trt. The government budget




+ gt + trt ¡ ¿t; (11)
where tax revenues, ¿t are given by,
¿t = ¿w
t wtht + ¿k
t (rk
t utkt ¡ ±qtutkt): (12)
Unlike monetary policy, there is no widely accepted speci¯cation for ¯scal policy. For instance, in
earlier work, McGrattan (1994) introduces reduced form ¯scal rules with a VAR representation of
exogenous state variables, namely technology shocks, government spending and tax rates. Braun
(1994) also runs a VAR for government spending and tax rates, and after dropping insigni¯cant
coe±cients settles on AR(1) processes for both spending and taxes. Leeper (1991) has a ¯scal
rule with taxes responding to the level of real outstanding government debt, and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2007) show that such rules can approximate optimal policy rules. Jones (2002) has a
reduced form representation where tax and spending rates are functions of their own lags, current
and lagged output and current and lagged hours, to re°ect the notion that policymakers care about
output and employment. He also distinguishes between the e®ects of exogenous ¯scal shocks and
e®ects of feedback rules. Mertens and Ravn (2008) assume stochastic AR(2) processes for tax
rates, and allow no feedback from the economy. However, they distinguish between anticipated and
unanticipated tax shocks.
In recent work, Romer and Romer (2007) use narrative evidence to identify the size and reasons
behind all major postwar tax policy actions. They ¯nd tax policy actions as either being motivated
by counter-cyclical actions or changes in spending, which they call endogenous policy changes, or
tax changes in order to deal with an inherited budget de¯cit or raise long-run growth, classi¯ed
as exogenous changes in their analysis. They estimate the e®ects of exogenous tax movements on
output and point out that failing to account for in°uences of economic activity on tax policy leads
to biased e®ects of macroeconomic e®ects of tax changes.12 In order to address such concerns,
in this paper, taxes are modeled to allow for automatic stabilizers by responding to the state of
12Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009) also emphasize endogeneity of tax policy.
11the economy and feedback reaction to debt in order to prevent large debt to GDP ratios, and the
processes for tax rates look as follows,13
^ ¿k
t = ½k^ ¿k




t = ½w^ ¿w




t denote innovations in the two tax rates and are i.i.d N(0;¾2
k) and N(0;¾2
w), respec-
tively. The response of the tax rates to the level of debt ensure ¯scal solvency. For instance, in
the case of increased government expenditures, taxes will respond to the increasing de¯cit so that
the intertemporal government budget constraint is satis¯ed. Note that the tax rates are assumed
to respond to lagged values of the debt and output deviations from the steady state. This helps to
isolate the e®ects of ¯scal shocks on the economy at least on impact, and is a reasonable assumption
as the model is used to match quarterly data.
Real government expenditures, gt, have a process with an autoregressive term and a response
to lagged output to capture automatic stabilizers14,





t is a government spending shock, assumed to be i.i.d N(0;¾2
g).15 Lump-sum transfers,
trt, have the following process which also features a response to the state of the economy. This
captures the fact that during recessions, transfers automatically go up, for instance in the form of
unemployment and welfare bene¯ts,
^ trt = ½tr ^ trt¡1 + ½tr;y^ yt¡1 + ²tr
t ; (16)
where ²tr
t represents a shock to transfers, and is i.i.d N(0;¾tr2). Transfers are modeled as neutral
payments in the model, and primarily play the role of a residual in the government budget con-
straint. So a transfer shock can be thought of as a shock to the budget constraint, not captured by
spending or tax shocks.16
13The ¯scal rules are speci¯ed in terms of taxes and expenditures. However, these ¯scal rules together with the
government's budget constraint imply an evolution process of debt or de¯cit, which at times seems the main policy
instrument in public debates.
14There is not as much empirical evidence for automatic stabilizers in the case of government spending, see for
instance Blanchard and Perotti (2002), but during the estimation, I assume ½g;y to have a normal distribution allowing
for the possibility of a pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical component of public spending on consumption and investment.
15Preliminary analysis during estimation did not yield evidence for government spending signi¯cantly responding
to the level of debt and hence is not considered here. However, in a recent paper with calibration, Corsetti, Meier,
and Muller (2009) model government spending to respond to the level of debt, and show that this causes an eventual
reversal of spending and can explain consumption rising in response to a government spending shock. Leeper, Plante,
and Traum (2009) also allow government spending to respond to the level of debt, in a real model studying ¯scal
¯nancing.
16The Appendix reports how alternative modeling assumptions for government spending and transfers compare to
this speci¯cation, in terms of marginal likelihood. These speci¯cations include exogenous process for transfers and
12The monetary authority follows a Taylor type rule,
^ Rt = ®R ^ Rt¡1 + (1 ¡ ®R)(®¼^ ¼t + ®Y ^ yt) + ²m
t ; (17)
with interest rate smoothing, governed by the parameter ®R and a response to deviation of in°ation
and output from their respective steady states, denoted by ^ ¼ and ^ yt respectively. ²m
t is a monetary
shock and is i.i.d N(0;¾2
m).
2.3 Firms
Each variety of ¯nal goods is produced by a single ¯rm in a monopolistically competitive environ-
ment. Each ¯rm i 2 [0;1] produces output using as factor inputs capital services, kit and labor
services, hit. The production technology is given by,
ztF(kit;hit) ¡ Ã; (18)
where F is a homogenous of degree one, concave function strictly increasing in both its arguments
and Ã introduces ¯xed costs of operating a ¯rm in each period, and are modeled to ensure a
realistic pro¯t-to-output ratio in steady state. The variable zt denotes an exogenous technology
shock, following an AR(1) process,
^ zt = ½z^ zt¡1 + ²z
t; (19)
where ½z 2 [0;1], and ²z
t is i.i.d N(0;¾2
z).
The objective of the ¯rm is to choose contingent plans for Pit, hit, and kit so as to maximize



















subject to demand functions for public, private and investment goods faced by ¯rm i. Here ait
denotes aggregate absorption of good i, which includes cit, iit and git. Note that price rigidities
are introduced following Rotemberg (1982), by assuming that the ¯rms face a quadratic price
adjustment cost for the good it produces. I choose this speci¯cation of price rigidities because
the introduction of deep habits makes the pricing problem dynamic and accounting for additional
dynamics arising from Calvo-Yun type price stickiness makes aggregation non-trivial.17
spending, and also allowing transfers to respond to the level of debt.
17Modeling price stickiness via a quadratic cost leads to the same Phillips curve and dynamics up to ¯rst order as
Calvo-Yun price stickiness.
132.4 Market Clearing
Integrating over all ¯rms and taking into account that the capital-labor ratio is common across
¯rms, the aggregate demand for the composite labor input, ht, satis¯es ht =
R 1
0 hitdi; and that the
aggregate e®ective level of capital, utkt satis¯es utkt =
R 1
0 kitdi; this implies a resource constraint
that looks as follows,
ztF(utkt;ht) ¡ Ã = ct + gt + it + a(ut)kt +
®
2




t ¡ ¹ ¼)
2 wt: (20)
Equilibrium marginal costs and capital-labor ratios are identical across ¯rms. Therefore, one
can aggregate the ¯rm's optimality conditions with respect to labor and capital. The complete set
of symmetric equilibrium conditions are given in the Appendix.
3 Estimation
The competitive equilibrium conditions of the model are log-linearized around a non-stochastic
steady state.18 The system of equations can then be written as follows,
xt = F(£)xt¡1 + Q(£)²t; (21)
where xt are the model variables, the matrices F and Q are functions of £, the structural parameters
of the model and ²t are the structural shocks in the model.
3.1 Data and Estimation Strategy
Since the focus of this paper is ¯scal policy in the context of a DSGE model, in departure from
most pre-existing Bayesian estimation papers, in addition to aggregate macroeconomic variables, I
include ¯scal variables as observable. The following quarterly data series, spanning 1958:1-2008:4,
are used in the estimation, [ct it ¼t Rt gt bt ¿k
t ¿w
t ], where ct is real per capita consumption, it is
real per capita investment, ¼t is price in°ation, Rt is the federal funds rate, gt is real per capita
total government purchases, bt is real federal debt held by public, ¿k
t is the capital tax rate and ¿w
t
is the labor tax rate.19 Details on the construction of each time series are provided in the Appendix.
The measurement equation connects the observables, obst to the model variables,
obst = H(£)xt + Àt: (22)
The matrix H is a function of the structural parameters of the model and Àt denotes measure-
ment errors. The dynamic system characterized by the state equation, (21) and this measurement
18The complete set of equilibrium conditions along with the steady state are given in the Appendix. The model is
log-linearized and solved using the method of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
19The data used in the estimation starts in 1958:1, due to unavailability of property tax data prior to that date,
which is used in the construction of capital tax data.
14equation is estimated using Bayesian techniques, where the object of interest is the joint posterior
distribution of the parameters, which combines the prior distribution and the likelihood function.
The priors for the parameters being estimated are given in the next subsection, and the likeli-
hood is computed using the Kalman ¯lter, under the assumption of all the structural shocks being
normally distributed. The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to sample from the posterior pro-
posal distribution, which is a multivariate normal, N(0;c§). The algorithm is initialized using the
maximized posterior mode from the optimization routine csminwel.m, by Chris Sims, and § is the
inverse of the numerical Hessian evaluated at this posterior mode. The scaling factor c is chosen
to ensure an acceptance rate of close to 30 %. 1.5 million draws are generated, where the ¯rst
500,000 are used as burn-in period, to lose any dependence on initial values. Ultimately, several
convergence diagnostics are used to ensure the convergence of these Monte Carlo chains.20
3.2 Calibration and Priors
Some of the parameters which are hard to identify or pin down in steady state are calibrated.
These include the discount factor ¯, set at 1:03¡1=4, which implies a steady-state annualized real
interest rate of 3 percent. The depreciation rate, ±, is set at 0:025, which implies an annual rate of
depreciation on capital equal to 10 percent. µ is set at 0:30, which corresponds to a steady state
share of capital income roughly equal to 30%. The labor elasticity of substitution, ~ ´ is set at 21,
and goods elasticity of substitution, ´ is set at 5:3, since with the introduction of deep habits the
price markup movements are jointly determined by deep habit parameters and ´ is generally not
well identi¯ed.
Some of the steady state variables are also calibrated based on averages over the sample period
considered in the paper. The share of government spending in aggregate output is set at 0:18,
and the annual average of the ratio of debt to GDP pins down the steady state value to be 0:33.
Similarly, the steady state values of the capital and labor tax rates are based on mean of the
constructed series of average tax rates over the sample size, and are 0.41 and 0.23 respectively.
Also, the steady state labor is set at 0:5, which corresponds to a Frisch elasticity of labor supply
of unity.
Table 2 shows the prior distribution for the parameters being estimated. These are consistent
with the literature and the means of the distribution were set based on estimates from pre-existing
studies. The autoregressive coe±cients in the shock processes have a beta distribution with a
mean of 0.7 and standard deviation of 0.2. The only exception is the government spending process
which is known to be highly persistent. The priors on standard deviations of the shocks have an
inverse gamma distribution and are quite disperse. The deep habit parameters are assumed to
have a beta distribution and the mean is in line with estimates from Zubairy (2009), where deep
habits are explored as a transmission mechanism for government spending shocks with a limited
information approach. The capacity utilization and investment adjustment cost parameters have
normal distributions with means of 2.5 and 2 respectively, in line with estimates from Smets and
20The diagnostics include trace plots, examining the autocorrelation functions and CUSUM plots.
15Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Calibrated value
± Depreciation rate 0.025
¯ Discount factor 0.9926
~ ´ Wage elasticity of demand 21
´ Price elasticity of demand 5.3
µ Capital share 0.30
¼ Steady state in°ation 1:042
1=4
u Steady state capacity utilization 1
h Steady state labor 0.5
g=y Share of govt. spending in GDP 0.18
b=y Ratio of debt to GDP (annual) 0.33
¿
k Steady state capital tax rate 0.41
¿
w Steady state labor tax rate 0.23
Wouters (2007) and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005). The coe±cient of relative
risk aversion ¾ is assumed to have a normal distribution with a mean of 2, which is higher than the
logarithmic case. The nominal rigidity parameters have a normal distributions where the means
correspond approximately with an adjustment frequency of close to four quarters, in the mapping
between the Phillips curve coe±cient implied by convex adjustment costs speci¯cation and the one
with Calvo-Yun type rigidities. The standard deviation of these prior distributions are large to
accommodate uncertainty in these parameters.
Monetary policy rule parameters have prior distributions similar to the ones adopted in Smets
and Wouters (2007) and the mean values are also consistent with estimates from Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2000). On the other hand for ¯scal policy rule parameters, the literature is less informative
and so the priors are di®use and span a larger parameter space. As mentioned above, the tax rate
processes are assumed to be persistent. The tax rate elasticities to debt are assumed to have a
gamma distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.2, which is similar to Forni,
Monteforte, and Sessa (2009). Blanchard and Perotti (2002) provide evidence regarding output
elasticities of tax revenues, an average value of 2.08. This would mean that with 1% increase in
output, tax revenues rise by close to 2%, which would roughly mean a 1% rise in tax rates. The
tax rate elasticities for both tax rates are thus assumed to have a gamma distribution with mean 1
and standard deviation of 0.5. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) ¯nd no strong evidence of automatic
stabilizers for government spending. Thus the government spending elasticity to output is assumed
to have a normal distribution with mean -0.05 and the transfers elasticity to output is assumed to
have a mean of -0.1. In order to further clarify the economic content of the priors, the Appendix
shows the ¯scal multipliers implied by the priors, in Table 6.
16Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Estimated Parameters.
Parameter Description Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean Std. Dev. Mean [5,95]
½k Autocorr. of ¿
k
t B 0.7 0.2 0.89 [0.88, 0.90]
½w Autocorr. of ¿
w
t B 0.7 0.2 0.91 [0.90, 0.92]
½g Autocorr. of gt B 0.8 0.2 0.92 [0.89, 0.93]
½d Autocorr. of dt B 0.7 0.2 0.68 [0.67, 0.70]
½tr Autocorr. of trt B 0.7 0.2 0.75 [0.73, 0.77]
½z Autocorr. of zt B 0.7 0.2 0.82 [0.80, 0.83]
½¹ Autocorr. of ¹t B 0.7 0.2 0.70 [0.67, 0.73]
¾k Std. Dev. of ²
k
t IG 0.5 1 0.012 [0.010, 0.013]
¾w Std. Dev. of ²
w
t IG 0.5 1 0.009 [0.008, 0.010]
¾g Std. Dev. of ²
g
t IG 0.5 1 0.015 [0.014, 0.017]
¾d Std. Dev. of ²
d
t IG 0.5 1 0.156 [0.137, 0.177]
¾tr Std. Dev. of ²
tr
t IG 0.5 1 0.054 [0.038, 0.090]
¾z Std. Dev. of ²
z
t IG 0.5 1 0.024 [0.021, 0.026]
¾m Std. Dev. of ²
m
t IG 0.5 1 0.018 [0.016, 0.020]
¾¹ Std. Dev. of ²
m
t IG 0.5 1 0.077 [0.072, 0.083]
b
c Deep habit in ct B 0.7 0.1 0.96 [0.95, 0.97]
µ
c Adj. of habit stock of ct B 0.8 0.1 0.58 [0.55, 0.60]
b
g Deep habit in gt B 0.7 0.1 0.74 [0.73, 0.76]
µ
g Adj. of habit stock of gt B 0.8 0.1 0.96 [0.95, 0.97]
® Price adj. cost N 17 5 44.07 [40.5, 47.7]
~ ® Wage adj. cost N 100 30 95.40 [92.4, 97.7]
¾ Preference parameter N 2 1 2.12 [2.01, 2.33]
¾u Capacity util. parameter N 2.5 0.5 2.57 [2.45, 2.68]
· Investment adj. cost N 2 0.5 3.04 [2.98, 3.07]
®R Int. rate smoothing B 0.8 0.2 0.52 [0.51, 0.54]
®¼ Response of Rt to ¼t N 1.6 0.2 1.55 [1.53, 1.56]
®Y Response of Rt to yt N 0.1 0.05 0.051 [0.045, 0.057]
½k;b Response of ¿
k
t to bt¡1 G 0.5 0.25 0.015 [0.009, 0.021]
½w;b Response of ¿
w
t to bt¡1 G 0.5 0.25 0.016 [0.010, 0.024]
½k;y Response of ¿
k
t to yt¡1 G 1 0.5 0.131 [0.119, 0.140]
½w;y Response of ¿
w
t to yt¡1 G 1 0.5 0.114 [0.101, 0.124]
½g;y Response of gt to yt¡1 N -0.05 0.05 -0.0032 [-0.012, 0.000]
½tr;y Response of trt to yt¡1 N -0.1 0.05 -0.122 [-0.141, -0.104]
Note: B denotes Beta, G denotes Gamma, IG denotes Inverse Gamma and N denotes Normal.
174 Estimation results
4.1 Parameter estimates
The mean and 5 and 95 percentiles of the posterior distribution for the parameters estimated are
given in Table 2. All the shocks are signi¯cantly persistent. The preference parameter, investment
adjustment cost and capacity utilization parameters are estimated to be consistent with estimates
in the literature.21 The degree of deep habit in private consumption is quite high, and the estimates
for µg and µc suggest that the stock of habits for both public and private consumption depreciates
slowly.
The monetary policy parameters are estimated to indicate high degree of interest rate smoothing
and a signi¯cant response to in°ation, satisfying the Taylor principle. Since monetary policy is
active for the sample considered here, ¯scal rule parameters are such that government debt is fully
backed by future taxes in order for the equilibrium to be determinate, and so that the intertemporal
government budget constraint is satis¯ed. The tax rates are persistent, and have a signi¯cant
response to both the level of debt and output. Capital tax rates are found to be more responsive
to the state of the economy than labor tax rates. While there is evidence for automatic stabilizers
for transfers, government spending is does not have a particularly large countercyclical component.
A discussion on the overall goodness of ¯t of the estimated model can be found in the Appendix.
Figure 13 displays the actual observable series used in the estimation along with the posterior mean
of their smooth version according to the estimated model. The ¯t for almost all variables is close to
perfect. Figure 14 and Table 7 compare a set of statistics implied by the model to those measured
in the data, and show that overall, the model seems to provide a good ¯t to the data.
4.2 Transmission of ¯scal shocks
Figures 1- 4 show the impulse response functions as a result of shocks to the ¯scal variables. The
x-axis shows quarters after the shock hits the economy and the y-axis shows percentage deviations
from the steady state. The impulse response functions are computed for randomly chosen 1000
parameter draws from the Monte Carlo chains. The solid lines denote the median response and the
dashed lines correspond to the 5th and 95h percentiles.
Figure 1 shows that in response to a 1 percent increase in government spending, output, con-
sumption, hours and wages rise, whereas investment falls with a delay. There are standard negative
wealth e®ects that leads households to increase labor supply which leads to a rise in output. There
is a negative wealth e®ect on consumption as well, but since the model embeds deep habits in
public and private consumption, an increase in government spending demand induces a decline
in the mark-ups. Recall, that due to deep habits when faced by a higher demand in the form
of increased government spending, ¯rms have an incentive to lower markups in order to hook a
21The parameter estimates for the preference and capacity utilization parameters are similar to the prior, but
robustness of these results were veri¯ed by estimating the model with di®erent priors, but the posterior converges to
very similar values.























































































Note: The dashed lines are the 95 % con¯dence bands. The y-axis gives the percentage deviation from
steady state and the x-axis gives the time horizon in quarters. The responses of in°ation and nominal
interest rate to the shock are annualized.
larger customer base in order to carry it into the next period. These variations in the markup shift
the labor demand and therefore, wages increase with output as a result of an increase in demand.
This higher real wage cause individuals to substitute away from leisure to consumption, and this
substitution e®ect is large enough to o®set the negative wealth e®ect so that overall consumption
rises in response to a government spending shock. However, these e®ects are short-lived since the
government spending is ¯nanced by a rise in distortionary taxes, which a®ects the marginal return
on labor and capital. Investment does not move much on impact and slowly falls in response to
a shock, primarily due to the rise in capital taxes. The fall in markup of prices over marginal
cost is also the reason for a fall in in°ation on impact, coming back slowly towards steady state as
the e®ects of the persistent movements in markups die down. Note, however that the movements
in in°ation and nominal interest rate are rather small.22 Also, initially real interest rate rises in
response to a government spending shock since nominal interest rate has a signi¯cant response to
22While this fall in in°ation in response to a government spending shock might seem counter-intuitive it has been
seen in VAR studies as well, for instance Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2002) who show a fall or an
insigni¯cant response of in°ation to government spending shocks.















































































Note: The dashed lines are the 95 % con¯dence bands. The y-axis gives the percentage deviation from
steady state and the x-axis gives the time horizon in quarters. The responses of in°ation and nominal
interest rate to the shock are annualized.
in°ation and output deviations, but the intertemporal substitution e®ects which have a negative
impact on consumption are too small and overall consumption rises in response to a spending shock.
The estimation is carried out using a full-information approach and ¯t the model to all the
variation in the data, not just the dynamic e®ects of a spending shock. Even then, the responses
of the variables are well in line with the literature on structurally identi¯ed VARs that study the
e®ects of government spending shocks (see for example Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Fatas and
Mihov (2001)). In particular, the model is in agreement with this literature in predicting positive
responses of consumption and wages to a spending shock. The positive response of consumption,
however, is small in magnitude and as mentioned earlier, relatively short-lived in the model. As
far as investment is concerned, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) also ¯nd an insigni¯cant response on
impact and a signi¯cantly negative response with a delay. The model predictions on investment
are although di®erent from Fatas and Mihov (2001), who show that investment falls on impact
and then slowly rises to become positive. Unlike the observable used in the estimation in this
paper, their measure of investment does not account for durable consumption. But they also show





















































































Note: The dashed lines are the 95 % con¯dence bands. The y-axis gives the percentage deviation from
steady state and the x-axis gives the time horizon in quarters. The responses of in°ation and nominal
interest rate to the shock are annualized.
separately that durable consumption rises in response to a spending shock.
Figure 2 shows that in response to a 1 percent decrease in the labor tax rate, output, hours,
consumption and investment all rise. Wages fall on impact and then slowly rise above steady
state. There is a wealth e®ect that results in consumption rising and labor falling, along with an
intratemporal substitution e®ect leading to consumption rising further and labor rising due to a
higher return on labor. This rise in labor supply results in wages rising in equilibrium. The cut in
labor tax rate also causes the return on capital to go up due to its e®ects on labor supply, leading to
a rise in investment. Investment has a hump-shaped response due to investment adjustment costs.
Also, note that since the degree of deep habit formation in private consumption is estimated to be
high, it suggests households have a strong desire to smooth consumption, which also translates in
a shift of demand from consumption to investment goods.
Figure 3 shows that a 1 percent fall in the capital tax rate results in hours, investment and wages
rising. Hours rise after a slight delay and consumption has a small negative response. With a fall
in capital tax rate, the after-tax return on capital goes up, resulting in a rise in investment. Here































































































Note: The dashed lines are the 95 % con¯dence bands. The y-axis gives the percentage deviation from
steady state and the x-axis gives the time horizon in quarters. The responses of in°ation and nominal
interest rate to the shock are annualized.
the response of investment is once again hump-shaped, and peaking at close to 5 quarters after
the shock hits the economy, because of investment adjustment cost. Intertemporal substitution
e®ects lead agents to delay consumption and raise labor supply. However, wealth e®ects work in
the opposite direction. In addition, capacity utilization goes up as there is reallocation from labor
to capital. These e®ects are generally similar to ones seen in standard neoclassical models (for
example Braun (1994)). Looking at the equilibrium e®ects on consumption and labor, one has to
take into account that soon after a fall in the capital tax rate, the labor tax rate rises to ¯nance
the de¯cit, and thus the consumption response is muted.
In both cases of a fall in labor and capital taxes, the model predicts a signi¯cant rise in invest-
ment. While the literature does not tend to distinguish between capital and labor taxes, Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), who identify a shock to total tax revenues in a SVAR, and Romer and Romer
(2007) who identify tax shocks using a narrative approach, both also ¯nd signi¯cant crowding out
of investment in response to a positive tax shock. Mertens and Ravn (2008) use the narrative
approach of Romer and Romer (2007) to distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated tax
22Table 3: Impact Multipliers
Government Spending Multiplier
Quarter 1 Quarter 4 Quarter 12 Quarter 20
¢Yt+k
¢Gt 1.12 0.85 0.16 -0.14
[1.10, 1.13] [0.79, 0.90] [0.06, 0.26] [-0.21, -0.07]
Labor Tax Multiplier
Quarter 1 Quarter 4 Quarter 12 Quarter 20
¢Yt+k
¢Tw
t 0.13 0.34 0.34 0.17
[0.11,0.15] [0.32, 0.41] [0.28 , 0.40] [0.11, 0.22]
Capital Tax Multiplier




0.33 0.36 0.19 0.04
[0.32, 0.34] [0.34, 0.39] [0.16, 0.22] [0.01, 0.07]
Note: These measure the increase in the level of output k quarters ahead in response to a change in
the ¯scal variable of interest at time t. The reported numbers are the median multipliers and the 95
percentiles are given below in brackets.
shocks. The responses in the model are consistent with their ¯ndings regarding responses to unan-
ticipated tax shocks. The only exception is the response of consumption to a capital tax shock,
but unlike the case shown in this paper, Mertens and Ravn (2008) consider the e®ects of capital
tax shocks while restricting the reaction of labor taxes.
Lastly, Figure 4 shows that the responses to a 1 percent rise in lump-sum transfers are all
insigni¯cant on impact. Transfers have a positive wealth e®ect, but as is clear from the ¯gure,
there is a negligible e®ect on impact and the medium to longer run responses are driven by the
rise in capital and labor taxes used to ¯nance this increase in transfers. Therefore, there is not a
signi¯cant positive stimulative e®ect on output.
5 The Estimated Size of Fiscal Multipliers
The stimulative e®ects of a ¯scal action are generally framed in terms of multipliers. Most of
the pre-existing evidence on multipliers comes from the empirical literature, which has explored
di®erent identi¯cation schemes for ¯scal shocks. This paper, however, is novel in its approach of
estimating both government spending and tax multipliers in the context of a structural general
equilibrium model, using a full information econometric methodology.
The e®ects of ¯scal policy are typically summarized by the impact multiplier, which is the
increase in the level of output k periods ahead in response to a change in the ¯scal variable of
23interest given by ¢Ft at time t.23




So the spending impact multiplier is given by,
¢Yt+k
¢Gt , and for the tax rates the impact multiplier
is given in terms of the change in total tax revenues, so its
¢Yt+k
¢Tt , where Tt denotes tax revenues.
The two tax shocks are normalized so that they result in a 1 percent decrease in total tax revenues.
The impact multipliers for the estimated model are reported in Table 3, along with 95 percentile
con¯dence bands for horizons of 1, 4, 12 and 20 quarters after the shock hits the economy. The
government spending multiplier for output is 1.12 on impact and slowly decreases to be negative
in the long-run. This means that on impact, a 1 percent of GDP increase in government spending
results in a larger than 1 percent overall increase in GDP.
The tax multipliers in the ¯rst quarter are small. A 1 percent of GDP fall in total tax revenues
driven by labor tax cuts and capital tax cuts result in a 0.13 percent and 0.33 percent rise in
GDP, respectively. But the e®ects of taxes take time to build, and both the capital and labor tax
multipliers are maximized between 4 and 12 quarters. However, magnitude-wise taxes consistently
have a smaller multiplier than spending for shorter horizons, and exceed the spending multiplier
for horizons of 12 and 20 quarters.
The impact multipliers, however, do not take into account that a shock at time t to tax rates
or government spending results in a particular future path for the ¯scal instruments given by the
processes de¯ned in the modeling section. In order to capture the cumulative e®ects of the ¯scal
shock along the entire path up to a given period, I follow Mountford and Uhlig (2002), and report
the present value multiplier, which also discounts future e®ects.








gives the increase in present value of output over the next k periods, as a result of a shock at time
t to the ¯scal variable of interest, F.
The present value multipliers are given in Table 4. The impact and present value multipliers
take the same value in quarter 1, by de¯nition. The present value tax multipliers build over time,
whereas the spending multiplier decreases across the horizon. At longer horizons, tax and spending
multipliers for output have the same magnitude. In fact, after close to 5 years, a cumulative one
dollar decrease in tax revenues driven by labor tax cuts results in a one dollar increase in GDP,
and exceeds the stimulative e®ects of increased spending. Notice also, that in terms of multipliers,
labor tax cuts while not as e®ective as capital tax cuts in the short-run, boost output to a larger
degree in the long-run.
Table 5 shows the present value spending and tax multipliers for components of GDP, consump-






G, where Y and G are
the steady state values of output and government spending respectively.
24Table 4: Present Value Multipliers
Government Spending Multiplier
Quarter 1 Quarter 4 Quarter 12 Quarter 20
PV ¢Yt+k
PV ¢Gt+k 1.12 1.13 0.97 0.77
[1.10, 1.13] [1.11, 1.14] [0.95, 0.99] [0.72, 0.81]
Labor Tax Multiplier




0.13 0.31 0.70 0.99
[0.11,0.15] [0.27, 0.35] [0.59, 0.82] [0.79, 1.23]
Capital Tax Multiplier




0.33 0.44 0.64 0.76
[0.32, 0.34] [0.42, 0.46] [0.58, 0.71] [0.64, 0.90]
Note: These measure the present discounted value of the cumulative change in output over the present
value cumulative change in the ¯scal variable of interest, over the k quarters. The reported numbers
are the median multipliers and the 95 percentiles are given below in brackets.
tion and investment. The spending multiplier for consumption is found to be positive, however
rather small in the short-run, and in the long-run is negative. This positive multiplier for con-
sumption is in line with structural VAR studies, while in contrast to standard models that do not
explicitly introduce a mechanism for public spending shock to transmit through the economy. The
spending multiplier for investment is not signi¯cant in the ¯rst few quarters but becomes negative
in the long-run. The positive multiplier for consumption and the insigni¯cant response of invest-
ment on impact also explain the size of the spending multiplier for output, being larger than one.
If for instance, consumption and investment are both crowded out in response to a spending shock,
and have negative multipliers, then the resulting multiplier for output would be less than one.24
Consumption has a small and positive multiplier in response to a labor tax shock on impact
which becomes larger at longer horizons. Conversely, the consumption multiplier is small and
negative in response to a capital tax shock. Also, notice that the multiplier for investment in
response to both tax shocks is sizable. This suggests that the expansionary e®ects of both labor
and capital tax cuts on output are primarily driven by the stimulative e®ects on investment.
Table 5 also shows the multipliers for hours worked in the model, since the main motivation
behind a ¯scal stimulus plan is typically to boost demand and to raise employment.25 Employment
24This is true in the estimated DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007), which is not developed to study ¯scal
policy, as they do not consider a transmission mechanism for government spending shocks and assume spending
¯nanced by lump-sum taxes.
25It might be worthwhile, however, to consider a model with search frictions in the labor market, to fully explain
the e®ects of ¯scal shocks on labor, both at the extensive (employment) and intensive (hours per worker) margins.
25Table 5: Present Value Multipliers for Consumption, Investment and Hours
Government Spending Multiplier
Quarter 1 Quarter 4 Quarter 12 Quarter 20
PV ¢Ct+k
PV ¢Gt+k 0.013 0.019 0.018 -0.004
[0.010, 0.015] [0.014, 0.022] [0.009, 0.022] [-0.021, 0.005]
PV ¢It+k
PV ¢Gt+k 0.017 0.013 -0.113 -0.268
[0.006, 0.028] [-0.009, 0.036] [-0.164, -0.070] [-0.356, -0.193]
PV ¢Ht+k
PV ¢Gt+k 0.670 0.661 0.582 0.507
[0.663, 0.677] [0.658, 0.667] [0.567, 0.593] [0.479, 0.525]
Labor Tax Multiplier




0.015 0.034 0.105 0.205




0.105 0.255 0.569 0.778




0.081 0.187 0.371 0.450
[0.074, 0.09] [0.171, 0.209] [0.324, 0.434] [0.369, 0.560]
Capital Tax Multiplier




-0.006 -0.009 -0.018 -0.031




0.072 0.163 0.326 0.419




-0.053 -0.006 0.032 -0.005
[-0.049, -0.057] [-0.014, 0.002] [0.017, 0.047] [-0.037, 0.024]
Note: The reported numbers are the median multipliers and the 95 percentiles are given below in
brackets.
26has a signi¯cantly positive spending multiplier, which is largest on impact, and slowly decaying
over the horizon. This increase in hours worked, as a result of increased public spending, is due
to both a rise in labor supply and demand. Labor supply shifts mainly because of households
anticipating an increase in taxes, and price rigidities and countercyclical markups lead to a rise in
labor demand of the ¯rms with the shift in aggregate demand. The employment multiplier is also
positive for labor tax cuts, and while on impact the e®ects are small, they build signi¯cantly over
time. These e®ects are primarily driven by the increase in labor supply due to the resulting higher
return on labor. Unlike increased spending and labor tax cuts, capital tax cuts do not stimulate
hours worked on impact. The multiplier for hours worked is positive for a range of 5-18 quarters
after the shock hits the economy, but even then the magnitude is much smaller than the e®ects
of alternative ¯scal instruments. This suggests that increased government spending and lowering
labor taxes are e®ective at stimulating hours worked.
There are some recent DSGE models where the e®ects of a spending shocks are estimated and
spending multipliers can be inferred. (See for example Coenen and Straub (2005), Lopez-Salido and
Rabanal (2006) and Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009).) These papers consider mechanisms to
replicate the positive response of consumption to a spending shock, as suggested by VAR evidence,
and ¯nd the spending multiplier in the range of 0.7 and 2. On the other hand, there has been no
signi¯cant prior work done on estimating tax multipliers in a structural model.26
There is, however, a great deal of evidence in the VAR literature measuring the stimulative
e®ects of spending increases and tax cuts. Studies employing structural VARs, such as Fatas
and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007), also
¯nd output multipliers for spending close to 1.27 As mentioned earlier, these papers also ¯nd
positive consumption multipliers. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) also emphasize the negative e®ect
on investment of an increase in government purchases, which is seen in the model at longer horizons
of 12 and 20 quarters.
The slow rise in the stimulative e®ects of tax cuts are also documented in this literature, for
example by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Romer and Romer (2007) and Mountford and Uhlig
(2002). The e®ects of tax shocks found here, however, are smaller than the ones documented in
these studies. One of the reasons is that they consider a shock to total tax revenues and do not
distinguish between labor and capital taxes. Mountford and Uhlig (2002) also document large
e®ects of tax cuts because they consider de¯cit ¯nanced tax shocks, whereas in the model, once
labor taxes are lowered in order to stimulate the economy, there is an eventual increase in capital
taxes in response to the resulting de¯cit. The signi¯cant response of investment to the tax shocks
is also found in this literature. Both Romer and Romer (2007) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
though employing di®erent identi¯cation schemes, ¯nd that tax raises are highly contractionary
26An exception is Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009) who estimate both tax and spending multipliers for the Euro
area.
27Ramey (2008) employs a narrative approach, based on identifying episodes of large military buildups, and ¯nds
the maximum spending multiplier to be 1.1. Mountford and Uhlig (2002) use a sign restrictions approach to identify
¯scal shocks, and ¯nd the spending multiplier to be 0.65. These variations in the multipliers can be attributed to
di®erences in identi¯cation schemes.
27primarily due to the e®ects on investment.
6 Counterfactual Fiscal Policy Experiments
6.1 De¯cits versus Tax Financing
In the baseline model, government spending is ¯nanced by an increase in taxes and government
debt. In this section, I evaluate the scenario where the government, relative to the historically
estimated rules, is more or less aggressively committed to retiring the debt. This is done in a
similar manner to the exercise shown in Uhlig (2009), where the rate at which taxes respond to
the level of debt is varied. More precisely, the processes for labor and capital tax rates are given
as follows,
^ ¿k
t = ½k^ ¿k
t¡1 + °½k;b^ bt¡1 + ½k;y^ yt¡1 + ²k
t; (23)
^ ¿w
t = ½w^ ¿w
t¡1 + °½w;b^ bt¡1 + ½w;y^ yt¡1 + ²w
t ; (24)
where ° = 1 corresponds to the baseline estimated rule. When ° is less than 1, then taxes are less
responsive to debt and government spending is primarily ¯nanced by issuing debt. The values of
° > 1 correspond with taxes rising more aggressively in response to a de¯cit, and so government
spending is ¯nanced by higher taxes than the baseline case.
Figure 5 shows the present value spending multiplier for output at various horizons, as ° is
varied between 0:5 and 10, where 0.5 is the smallest value for which the equilibrium is determinate.
In the short-run both the spending and output multipliers are generally una®ected as taxes are
overall slow to adjust to the rising level of debt. However, at longer horizons the multipliers
become signi¯cantly smaller when taxes respond more aggressively to the level of debt, in response
to spending and tax shocks. In the case of tax shocks, because agents in the economy internalize
that a tax cut today will be ¯nanced by aggressive tax increases in the future, the present value
multipliers for longer horizons in fact become negative.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of debt over a horizon of 20 quarters for varying degrees of °, in
response to a government spending shock. Typically, debt takes as long as 50-100 years to come
back to steady state. The slow evolution of debt has been documented by others, such as Chung
and Leeper (2007). After ¯scal disturbances hit the economy, when ° is as high as 5 or 10, then
debt returns to steady state in 5-15 years. In conclusion, while the multipliers are mostly una®ected
at shorter horizons of up to a year, the method of ¯nancing, either by increased de¯cits or raising
taxes, is important for longer-run consequences.
6.2 Lump-sum versus Distortionary Taxation
A common assumption in the literature is exogenous ¯scal policy with de¯cits ¯nanced by lump-
sum taxes, which implies Ricardian equivalence holds and the timing of the taxes does not a®ect the
equilibrium. However, as pointed out in Baxter and King (1993), in a neoclassical model there are
signi¯cant di®erences between government spending ¯nanced by changes in tax rates or changes in
28Figure 5: Counterfactual experiment: De¯cit versus tax ¯nancing

























g, speed at which taxes rise in response to level of debt
1st qtr 4th qtr 12th qtr 20th qtr
Note: The x-axis is the value of °, the speed at which taxes respond to debt in the counterfactual
exercise. ° = 1 corresponds to the baseline estimated model.
29Figure 6: Response of debt to a government spending shock for varying values of °
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Note: ° is the speed at which taxes respond to debt in the counterfactual exercise. ° = 1 corresponds
to the baseline estimated model. The x-axis gives the time horizon in quarters.
lump-sum transfers. The changes in lump-sum transfer payments are equivalent to debt ¯nancing
when sequences for tax rates are ¯xed. In fact, in their calibrated model, there is a negative e®ect
on output of an increase in government purchases when it is ¯nanced entirely by distortionary
taxes. This is because of strong substitution e®ects on labor supply of tax rates.
In this section, the spending multiplier in the case of the estimated endogenous rules for tax rates
are compared with the scenario when instead of the distortionary taxes responding, the spending is
¯nanced by lump-sum taxes. This is done by shutting down the response of the distortionary taxes,
by setting ^ ¿w
t = ^ ¿k
t = 0. In order to model the increase in lump-sum taxes instead, in Equation
(16), I consider an additional term, where lump-sum transfers respond to the level of debt. This
means that after an increase in government spending, while tax rates do not respond, lump-sum
transfers adjust to ensure ¯scal solvency and the return of the level of debt to steady state.28
Figure 7 shows that the present value spending multiplier for output is consistently lower in
the case of spending ¯nanced by distortionary taxes. Note, however, that the method of ¯nancing
government spending, at least in the short run does not have very signi¯cant e®ects. This is
because, in the baseline model with distortionary taxes, the tax rates do not respond on impact
and otherwise evolve slowly. Looking at the longer horizon, in the case of spending ¯nanced by
lump-sum taxes, the multiplier is near one even close to 20 quarters, whereas in the estimated
model with endogenous tax rates, the multiplier signi¯cantly decreases over time. This points
28This is done by setting the coe±cient of transfer to lagged debt, ½tr;b = ¡0:1, where this values ensures determi-
nacy of equilibrium or the intertemporal government budget constraint being satis¯ed.
30Figure 7: Counterfactual experiment: Lump-sum versus distortionary taxation
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distortionary taxes lump−sum taxes
Note: The present value spending multiplier for output is computed under the estimated model with
the endogenous estimated rule for tax rates and in the case when tax rates do not respond and spending
is ¯nanced by lump-sum taxes instead. The x-axis gives the time horizon in quarters.
towards careful consideration of conclusions about e®ects of ¯scal policy in simpler models where
government purchases are assumed to be ¯nanced entirely by lump-sum taxes which is equivalent
to de¯cit ¯nancing.
6.3 Automatic Stabilizers
In this section, the role of automatic stabilizers is explored on the present value spending multiplier
for output. These capture changes in government revenues and expenditures due to the changes in
the state of the economy and do not require any discretionary action on the part of the government
while playing the role of stabilizing °uctuations in the economy. This is done by varying the value
of ¹ in the following processes,
^ ¿k
t = ½k^ ¿k
t¡1 + ½k;b^ bt¡1 + ¹½k;y^ yt¡1 + ²k
t; (25)
^ ¿w
t = ½w^ ¿w
t¡1 + ½w;b^ bt¡1 + ¹½w;y^ yt¡1 + ²w
t ; (26)
^ gt = ½g^ gt¡1 + ¹½g;y^ yt¡1 + ²
g
t; (27)
^ trt = ½tr ^ trt¡1 + ¹½tr;y^ yt¡1 + ²tr
t : (28)
Figure 8 reports the present value spending multiplier at di®erent horizons for di®erent values
of ¹. The automatic stabilizers take the estimated values when ¹=1. In the case of a government
31Figure 8: Present value government spending multiplier for output for varying values of ¹
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Note: ¹ is the speed at which automatic stabilization takes place in the counterfactual exercise. ¹ = 1
corresponds to the baseline estimated model. The x-axis gives the time horizon in quarters.
spending shock hitting the economy, it raises output, which results in a rise in capital and labor
tax rates, and a decrease in transfers due to their countercyclical nature.
Now, when these stabilizers are larger, in order to dampen short-run °uctuations in the economy,
the e®ects of an increase in government spending are reduced at all horizons, since the economy is
stabilized by further increases in taxes and decreases in transfers. However, even though this is a
short-run mechanism for mitigating the impact on demand, the e®ects in the long-run are further
exacerbated, as seen in the diverging present value multipliers at horizons close to 20 quarters.
7 Sensitivity of Fiscal Multipliers to Monetary Policy
In this section, I consider how the stance of the monetary policy a®ects the size of ¯scal multipliers.
The role of monetary authority is important in determining the movements of the real interest
rate, which through intertemporal e®ects plays a role in how macroeconomic variables react to
¯scal shocks.
I start by exploring how the coe±cients in the monetary policy rule a®ect the impact multiplier
of output in response to the government spending, capital and labor tax shocks, shown in Figure
9. In the top panel, the nominal interest rate smoothing parameter, ®R, is varied between 0.01
and 0.99, keeping the other parameters constant. The spending and capital tax multipliers for
output rise with a higher value of ®R, whereas the labor tax multiplier falls for higher values of
the parameter. This is because in the case of spending and capital tax cuts, a higher value of
32®R means the monetary authority increases the real interest rate less rapidly, thus increasing the
expansionary e®ects of these ¯scal actions. In response to a labor tax cut, the model predicts a fall
in in°ation. Therefore higher values of ®R imply that the desire to smooth interest rate strengthens
in opposition to the downward pressure on interest rate due to e®ects of in°ation.
The middle panel of Figure 9 shows that as the coe±cient on in°ation in the monetary policy
rule, ®¼ is perturbed, it does not signi¯cantly alter the impact multipliers in the case of increased
government spending or reduced taxes overall. This is because in°ation has a limited response to
the ¯scal shocks. However, notice also that as ®¼ increases, the largest e®ect is on the impact labor
tax multiplier, which decreases. This is because a labor tax cut causes households to increase labor
supply due to a higher return on labor. This causes a fall in wages and lower marginal costs results
in a fall in in°ation. Therefore a larger response to in°ation results in a smaller rise in real interest
rate, though these e®ects are small in magnitude.
The last panel, shows that as the coe±cient on output, ®Y , is varied between 0 and 0.5, the
impact multipliers are signi¯cantly a®ected, particularly in the case of the government spending
multiplier for output. As ®Y rises, the impact multiplier for output uniformly falls in the case of
all ¯scal shocks. If the nominal interest rate are highly responsive to the deviations of output from
the steady state, then in the case of both spending and tax shocks, the nominal interest rate will
rise sharply, causing the real interest rate to go up. This leads to a fall in aggregate demand and
results in a smaller output multiplier.29
The role of monetary policy is explored further by considering two extreme cases, one where the
monetary authority is very aggressive in stabilizing both in°ation and output (®¼=2 and ®Y =0.5),
and the second where the monetary policy does not react signi¯cantly to variations in the state of
the economy (®¼=1.1 and ®Y =0).30 Figure 10 shows the present value ¯scal multipliers for output,
consumption and investment under these two rules and the estimated monetary policy rule. The
x-axis shows the horizon in quarters.
The ¯rst row in Figure 10 shows the present value government spending multiplier. The mul-
tipliers for all components of demand are found to be larger than the baseline case under the
accommodative monetary policy, and smaller in the case of the aggressive monetary rule. In the
estimated model, because markups are countercyclical, a government spending shock leads to an
initial small decline in in°ation, and in°ation eventually rises once aggregate demand comes back
to normal. The nominal interest rate responds signi¯cantly to both in°ation and the rise in output,
and overall this results in a rise in the real interest rate. In the case of aggressive monetary policy,
the real interest rate rises more than the baseline scenario which is primarily due to the strong
response to deviations in output from the steady state. This leads to a fall in both consumption
and investment demand in response to a government spending shock, and the output multiplier is
less than one, even on impact. The case of monetary policy with a limited response to in°ation
and output results in the real interest rate falling in response to a government spending shock,
29These e®ects of the size of the coe±cient on deviations of output in the monetary policy rule, ®Y , on aggregate
demand in response to a government spending shock, are also pointed out in Linnemann and Schabert (2003).
30Note that ®¼ = 1:1 is the smallest reaction consistent with a determinate equilibrium in the estimated model.
33Figure 9: Sensitivity of ¯scal multipliers to monetary rule parameters
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y, coefficient on output in the monetary policy rule
Government spending multiplier Labor tax multipltier Capital tax multiplier
Note: The top panel shows the government spending, labor and capital tax multipliers on impact for
output, for varying degree of ®R, the smoothing parameter, the middle panel shows multipliers for
varying degree of®¼, the coe±cient on in°ation and the bottom panel shows the multipliers when ®Y ,
the coe±cient on output, is varied in the Taylor type monetary policy rule. The vertical lines correspond
to the estimated values of the parameters.
34which creates an incentive for agents to consume and invest more, thus raising the government
spending multiplier. This suggests that if the monetary authority reacts strongly to the state of
the economy, then it limits the stimulative e®ects of increased government spending. Alternatively,
in the presence of a relatively accommodative monetary policy, government spending has a higher
stimulative e®ect on aggregate demand.31
The same e®ects are at play in response to a capital tax cut, as shown in the second row of
Figure 10, so that an accommodative monetary policy results in a higher overall stimulative e®ects
on output, consumption and investment.
However, less responsive monetary policy does not imply a larger stimulative e®ect in the case
of all ¯scal measures. The last row of Figure 10 shows the labor tax multiplier in the case of
the estimated monetary policy rule, along with the two alternate rules. The labor tax multipliers
for output, consumption and investment are lower in the case of both new rules, relative to the
estimated monetary policy rule. When ®¼=1.1 and ®Y =0 , since in°ation falls in response to the
cut in labor taxes, a smaller response to in°ation results in a larger rise in real interest rate than the
baseline estimated model, causing components of demand to fall. This leads to a smaller multiplier
e®ect of labor tax cuts when the monetary policy is not reacting strongly to both in°ation and
output. In the case of ®¼=2 and ®Y =0.5, the rise is real interest rate is limited due to the large
response to in°ation, but because of the aggressive response to deviations of output from steady
state, overall real interest rate rises much more than the baseline case. This once again results in
a smaller multiplier in response to a labor tax cut.
In this section, I have shown that the stance of monetary policy has important implications for
the size of ¯scal multipliers. An accommodative monetary policy that has a limited response to
in°ation and output deviations, results in higher overall stimulative e®ects of increased spending
and capital tax cuts. This is however, not the case for all ¯scal measures, as shown in the case of
labor tax cuts. In this paper, I consider the case of active monetary policy, since ¯scal policy is
estimated to be passive. Recent work by Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009), Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009) and Eggertsson (2009) provide supporting evidence, to show that
when the monetary policy is completely unresponsive or the nominal interest is at the zero bound,
the monetary-¯scal interactions have signi¯cant e®ects on the size of ¯scal multipliers.
8 Simulating the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009
In early 2009, the US Congress passed a $ 787 billion package in order to stimulate the economy.
The stimulus package comprises of both increased government spending and tax cuts. In this
31Davig and Leeper (2009) also document similar interactions between monetary policy and the size of ¯scal stimulus
due to increased spending, where monetary policy determines the size of the implied intertemporal substitution e®ects
arising in response to a spending shock, and thus the ultimate response of components of aggregate demand. Their
focus however is regime switching in both monetary and ¯scal policy, and they characterize ¯scal multipliers also in
the regime where monetary policy is passive and ¯scal policy is active.
35Figure 10: Fiscal multipliers for various monetary policy rules.















































































































































Note: The ¯rst row shows the present value spending multiplier for output, consumption and investment
at various horizons. The second row shows the present value capital tax multipliers, and the last row
shows the present value labor tax multipliers. The x-axis gives the time horizon in quarters. The solid
line is the baseline estimated model, the dashed line is the passive monetary policy rule (®¼ = 1:1 and
®Y = 0) and the dash dotted line is the aggressive monetary policy rule (®¼ = 2 and ®Y = 0:5) .
36Figure 11: Simulating the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
















Labor tax rate 
Panel B
Note: Panel A shows the implied government spending path and Panel B shows the labor tax cut
implied by the stimulus package. The y-axis gives percentage deviations from steady state.
section, the e®ects of the package on the economy are analyzed by simulating the implied changes
in government spending and taxes in the estimated model.
In order to analyze the impact of increased spending contained in the stimulus package, note
that two thirds of the bills goes towards public investment and government purchases, and aid
to state governments. These government purchases, are mostly one time only expenditures and
phased to take place over the course of several years. The transfers to state and local governments
are to be used both for purchases of goods and services, and towards avoiding raising taxes. Romer
and Bernstein (2009) assume that 60% of these transfers are used towards spending. Cogan, Cwik,
Taylor, and Wieland (2009) use this assumption and report the path of government purchases as a
share of GDP due to the stimulus package, over the course of the next few years. Roughly a third
of the package goes towards tax cuts. The largest component, close to $ 116 billion, is in the form
of payroll tax credits.32 In the model, these payroll tax credits can be thought of as a cut in the
labor income tax rate.33
In order to simulate the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 in the model, the
path of government purchases from this stimulus package, as speci¯ed by Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and
Wieland (2009), is introduced as a sequence of anticipated shocks into the economy. This means
that in 2009:I, agents in the economy observe the entire path of expected government spending as
shown in Figure 1, Panel A. In addition, the tax cut is introduced as a 1% cut in labor income taxes
in 2009:I, as shown in Figure 1, Panel B. Next the responses to both these shocks are computed in
the model and are shown in Figure 2. The model predicts that the e®ects on GDP of the stimulus
32The rest are tax cuts for individuals in the form of expanded child credits, college credit, home buyer's credit etc.
A small fraction are tax cuts for companies, for example to use current losses to o®set pro¯ts made in the previous
¯ve years and extended tax credits for renewable energy production.
33Since, these payroll tax credits are close to 2 percent of the total tax revenues, and Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
estimate the output elasticity of total tax revenues to be 2.08, this can be thought of as a 1% decrease in the tax
rate. Uhlig (2009) also simulate this tax change as a 1 % reduction in the labor tax rate.
37Figure 12: Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009









































Note: Impact of combined ¯scal actions, increased spending and cut in labor taxes, implied by
the ARRA 2009. The y-axis gives percentage deviations from steady state.
package would be most signi¯cantly felt during early 2010. There is a small increase in output
initially as the households anticipate larger spending in the following years and while the tax cuts
are initialized in 2009, their e®ects take time to build and the largest impact on GDP is a few
quarters after the initial shock. Also notice that by late 2012, output multiplier is negative, even
though government spending is still above steady state in order to stimulate the economy. This
is because the agents are forward-looking and internalize that the large increase in spending is
going to be ¯nanced by higher taxes. In fact, in response to the government spending stimulus
alone, the consumption multiplier is negative starting mid 2010, because of households anticipating
expenditures ¯nanced by higher taxes. It is also clear that this ¯scal expansion comes with a large
increase in the level of debt, which remains above steady state for many years.
While the government purchases path is taken from Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009),
the impact on GDP of the ¯scal stimulus package are found to be larger than the ones reported
in their paper. Focusing only on the e®ects of government spending, Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and
Wieland (2009) ¯nd the e®ects on GDP maximized in 2010, and that is an increase in GDP of
close to 0.5 % (as shown in Figure 2 of their paper). However, the estimated model predicts
GDP rising by as much as 0.78% due to increased spending alone, in late 2010. These di®erences
arise because Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009) compute the impact on GDP based on
spending multipliers from the estimated DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007), which are
smaller than the ones estimated in this paper. Unlike the model of ¯scal policy in this paper, in
Smets and Wouters (2007), spending is ¯nanced by lump-sum taxes and the primary e®ects of
38increased government spending are negative wealth e®ects experienced by the households, resulting
in a signi¯cant crowding out of both private consumption and investment. They do not consider a
transmission mechanism for government spending and thus produce an empirically counterfactual
large negative response of consumption to a positive spending shock.
One caveat to note in this analysis is that this has not taken into account that the role of
monetary policy under current circumstances is limited as the Fed has recently been holding the
nominal interest rate near zero.
In addition, since the model has a feedback from output to government spending, some of the
changes in spending might be attributed to automatic stabilizers and would not be a shock. It is
important to notice though that the countercyclical component of government spending is estimated
to be rather small. To verify whether automatic stabilizers are signi¯cant in this case, I simulate
government spending for 2009:1, using data on GDP and spending in 2008, and do not ¯nd evidence
of larger deviations of government spending from steady state relative to 2008. This suggests that
the extraordinary increase in government spending introduced in the stimulus package is in fact
discretionary ¯scal policy.
9 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the e®ects of ¯scal policy actions in the context of a model
featuring distortionary tax rates and rich ¯scal rules, estimated using detailed ¯scal data on tax
rates, spending and debt.
I ¯nd that government spending has a large stimulative e®ect on impact, which decreases
signi¯cantly at longer horizons. Tax cuts, on the other hand are always less stimulative in the
short-run but their e®ects build over time. In particular, the impact multiplier for government
spending is 1.12 and the estimated model predicts a positive response of private consumption to
government spending, which is in contrast to models that do not consider a channel of transmission
of government spending shocks, but is consistent with empirical studies. The multipliers for labor
and capital tax on impact are 0.13 and 0.33 respectively, which exceed the stimulative e®ects of
increased spending at horizons of 12-20 quarters. These e®ects of tax shocks are primarily driven
by the response of investment.
In addition, counterfactual exercises reveal that the speed at which government debt is retired
following a ¯scal shock has consequences for the stimulative e®ect of the ¯scal policy action, and
these are most important at longer-run horizons. Also, although governments might rely on dis-
cretionary ¯scal policy to stimulate the economy in the short-run, there are long lasting dynamics
and the short-run e®ects can sharply di®er from long-run e®ects of a ¯scal policy action.
While assessing the role of monetary policy, I ¯nd that the response of the monetary authority to
deviations of output from the steady state is signi¯cantly important in determining the movements
of the real interest rate. This in turn, through intertemporal e®ects, has consequences for the
size of ¯scal multipliers. In fact, if the monetary authority reacts strongly to the state of the
39economy, then it limits the stimulative e®ects of increased government spending. Conversely, an
accommodative monetary results in a higher ¯scal multipliers for increased spending. However,
less responsive monetary policy does not imply a larger stimulative e®ect in the case of all ¯scal
measures, as shown in the case of labor tax cuts.
4010 Appendix
10.1 Complete Set of Symmetric Equilibrium Conditions
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41and equations (2), (8), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17) and (19) from the text.
10.2 Steady State
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4210.3 Data used in estimation
The following quarterly series were used in the estimation. In order to construct real per-capita
values, GDP de°ator (given by Table 1.1.6, Line 1) and civilian non-institutional population, over
16 (given by LNU00000000Q, at Bureau of Labor Statistics) are used. The table and line numbers
refer to the NIPA tables on the Bureau of Economic Analysis website. The data for consumption,
investment, government spending and debt were linearly detrended to get stationary series.
² Consumption: Sum of personal consumption expenditures on non-durables goods (Table
1.1.5, Line 3) and services (Table 1.1.5, Line 5) divided by the GDP de°ator and by popula-
tion.
² In°ation: First di®erence of GDP de°ator.
² Federal funds rate: Monthly federal funds rate series from St. Louis FRED website was
averaged to create quarterly series.
² Investment: Sum of gross private domestic investment (Table 1.1.5, Line 6) and personal
consumption expenditures on nondurable goods (Table 1.1.5, Line 4), divided by the GDP
de°ator and by population.
² Government spending: Government consumption expenditures and gross investment (Ta-
ble 1.1.5, Line 20) divided by the GDP de°ator and by population.
² Debt: Market value of federal debt held by public from the Dallas Fed website divided by
the GDP de°ator and by population. The quarterly series is constructed by summing up the
monthly series. The series of debt initialized by the Dallas Fed series and constructed from
secondary de¯cit data from NIPA matches up in levels and the correlation is 0.99.
² Capital and labor tax rate: The method of Jones (2002) was used to construct these
series. The ¯rst step is to construct the average personal income tax rate,
¿p =
FIT + SIT
W + PRI=2 + CI
where FIT denotes federal income taxes (Table 3.2, Line 3), SIT denotes state and local
income taxes (Table 3.3, Line 3), W denotes wages and salaries (Table 1.12, Line 3), PRI
denotes proprietor's income (Table 1.12, Line 9) and CI denotes capital income which is
the sum of rental income (Table 1.12, Line 12), corporate pro¯ts (Table 1.12, Line 13), net
interest (Table 1.12, Line 18) and PRI=2. The labor tax rate, ¿w, is then calculated as,
¿w =
¿p[W + PRI=2] + CSI
EC + PRI=2
where CSI is total contributions to government social insurance (Table 3.1, Line 7) and EC
denotes total compensation of employees (Table 1.12, Line 2). The capital tax rate, ¿k is
calculated as,
¿k =
¿pCI + CT + PT
CT + PT
The tax rates are constructed as average tax rates using the methodology in Mendoza, Razin,
and Tesar (1994) and Jones (2002), primarily because they are easily constructed on a quar-
terly basis using data on actual tax payments and national accounts, and in addition allow
43us to distinguish between taxes on labor and capital income. Other tax rate series include
Barro and Sahasakul (1983) marginal tax rate series on personal income, where they aver-
age tax rates over the number of returns for each class of adjusted gross income. However,
this does not di®erentiate between tax rates on capital and labor income. McGrattan (1994)
linearly interpolates annual tax rates constructed following Joines (1981) to obtain quarterly
observations. The main di®erence between Jones (2002) and their tax rate series is that they
estimate the personal income tax rate as a marginal tax rate from tax records, rather than
as an average rate from the national accounts. While much easier to construct, Mendoza,
Razin, and Tesar (1994) show that average tax rates in di®erent countries tend to follow the
same dynamics as marginal tax rates.34
10.4 Multipliers Implied by the Priors
To evaluate the economic content of the priors of the parameters being estimated, Table 6 shows
their implications for the ¯scal multipliers, that are the focus of the paper. The table reports the
median and 95 percentile present value multipliers for 500 random draws from the prior distribution
of the parameters. Since deep habits are introduced as a transmission mechanism, notice that the
median impact multiplier for government spending is larger than 1. However, as the con¯dence
bands illustrate that the priors do not exclude the possibility of a much smaller spending multiplier.
In general, tax multipliers are smaller than spending multiplier at early horizons. Also, note that
the con¯dence bands are large, particularly for longer horizons, which re°ects the disperse priors
for ¯scal rule parameters.
Table 6: Present Value Multipliers Implied by the Priors
Government Spending Multiplier
Quarter 1 Quarter 4 Quarter 12 Quarter 20
PV ¢Yt+k
PV ¢Gt+k 1.06 0.93 0.41 0.12
[0.7, 1.8] [0.5,1.9] [-0.2, 1.7] [-0.65, 1.4]
Labor Tax Multiplier




0.10 0.22 0.40 0.25
[0.0,0.3] [0.0, 0.5] [-1.0, 0.9] [-6.2, 1.5]
Capital Tax Multiplier




0.45 0.61 0.73 0.59
[0.3, 0.8] [0.3, 1.1] [-0.3, 1.6] [-5.0, 1.9]
Note: This table shows the present discounted value of the cumulative change in output over the present
value cumulative change in the ¯scal variable of interest, over the k quarters, for 500 random draws
from the prior distribution of the parameters. The reported numbers are the median multipliers and
the 95 percentiles are given below in brackets.
34Following Jones (2002), since the labor tax rate series has a trend and its idiosyncratic with no counterpart in
the model, it is removed by linearly detrending the series. Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) also show that in many
di®erent countries, the capital tax series is stationary but the labor tax series has an upward trend.
44Table 7: Moment Comparison
Data Model
Median [5,95]
Std. Dev. of Output (%) 3.62 4.65 [3.24, 5.31]
Standard Deviation/ Standard Deviation of Output
Consumption 0.83 0.86 [0.77, 0.97]
Investment 2.94 4.50 [3.19, 5.64]
In°ation 0.16 0.18 [0.13, 0.21]
Nominal Interest Rate 0.87 0.52 [0.32, 0.74]
Government Spending 1.41 0.85 [0.64, 1.18]
Capital tax rate 0.89 1.13 [0.70, 1.88]
Labor tax rate 0.45 0.83 [0.41, 1.01]
Hours 1.02 1.15 [0.74, 1.70]
For randomly chosen 1000 draws, I generate 500 samples of the observable series implied by the model
with the same length as the data-set (204 observations) after discarding the ¯rst 80 initial observations.
The table reports the median and 5th and 95th percentile together with the corresponding moment in
the data.
10.5 Fit of the Model
In order to assess the goodness of ¯t of the model, Figure 13 shows the data used in the estimation,
along with the posterior mean of the smoothed series implied by the estimated model. The ¯t of
the model is nearly perfect for most variables, notably government spending and tax rates. The
model predicts consumption relatively smoother than is observed. The only signi¯cant discrepancy
is in°ation where the model implies less overall volatility.
Table 7 also reports the standard deviations computed from data and those implied by the
model. It also reports the 90 percent probability intervals that account for both parameter uncer-
tainty and small sample uncertainty. Relative to the data, the model over-predicts the standard
deviation of output a little, and approximately matches the relative standard deviation of con-
sumption, in°ation and hours. There is some tendency to over-predict the volatility of investment,
and tax rates and under predict the volatility of nominal interest rate and government spending.
Note that the estimated model does not perfectly match these moments, since I am employing a
likelihood based estimation procedure, which tries to match the entire structure of the data series,
including second moments, autocorrelations and cross-correlations.
Figure 14 shows the autocorrelations and cross-correlations generated by the model and in the
data for selected observable variables. The model predictions are the black lines, where the solid
black line is the median and the dashed lines are the 90 percent posterior intervals. The data is
represented by the grey lines. The diagonal of the ¯gure shows that the model is able to capture the
decaying autocorrelation structure of the variables quite well. Generally, the data cross-correlations
fall within the con¯dence bands. These error bands, however, are quite large, accounting for both
parameter and small sample uncertainty.
45Figure 13: Model ¯t
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Note: The thin red line is the data used in the estimation and the thick blue line is posterior mean of







































































































































































































































Note: The black line represent the median cross-correlations implied by the model along with the 90%
con¯dence bands (dash-dotted line). The grey lines are the data cross-correlations. Each column gives
the correlation between Xt and the variable speci¯ed, where Xt is given in each row. The x-axis gives
the values of k.
4710.6 Model Comparison to Alternative Speci¯cation of Fiscal Rules
I compare the baseline model with the processes for government spending and transfers given by
Equations (15) and (16), with one where both government spending and transfers have exogenous
AR(1) processes and do not respond to the state of the economy (so that ½g;y = ½tr;y = 0).
Exogenous processes for ¯scal variables, especially government spending are a common assumption
in the literature.
I also compare the baseline model to the case where the government spending process is given
by Equation (15) but I allow transfers to additionally respond to the level of lagged debt, so that
the process for transfers, instead of Equation (16), is given by,
^ trt = ½tr ^ trt¡1 + ½tr;y^ yt¡1 + ½tr;b^ bt¡1 + ²tr
t :
In order to compare the estimated baseline model with di®erent speci¯cations of ¯scal rules, I
report the log marginal likelihood for two alternative models relative to the baseline model, in Table
8. These were computed using the modi¯ed harmonic mean proposed by Geweke (1999). According
to this criterion, eliminating any feedback from the economy to government spending and transfers
worsens the ¯t of the model, even though the marginal likelihood penalizes over-parametrization.
The log marginal likelihood di®erence between the baseline case and allowing transfers to respond
to the level of debt, in addition to the tax rates, is close to three. As argued in Rabanal and Rubio-
Ramirez (2005), this di®erence cannot be accepted as decisive evidence in favor of one model over
the other.
Table 8: Model Comparison
Speci¯cation Log Marginal Likelihood
(Di®erence from Baseline)
Exogenous processes for trt and gt -63.5
Also allow trt to respond to bt¡1 3.1
Note: The table shows the log marginal likelihood for di®erent model speci¯cations minus that for the
baseline model.
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